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TOWARDS ENVIRONMENTAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP:  
RESTORING THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN NEW YORK 
MICHAEL SETH BENN†
INTRODUCTION 
The public trust doctrine provides that government holds title to 
certain lands and waterways in trust for the public benefit and public 
use.1  While the common law doctrine varies from state to state, his-
torically it “requires that . . . trust land[s] be accessible and used for a 
public purpose; that [they] be put to . . . uses appropriate to the re-
source; and, in some cases, that [they] not be sold.”2  It does not, 
however, foreclose the private lease and license of public lands; 
rather, it requires that such lands be utilized primarily for the public 
benefit, and only incidentally for private benefit.3  Thus, fundamen-
tally, the public trust doctrine incorporates a public use test. 
The New York public trust doctrine, as it applies to public park-
land, has nebulously defined “public benefit” and “public use” as a 
“park,” in contrast to a “non-park,” use.4  In this Comment, I argue for 
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process, as well as the Board, Senior Editors, and Associate Editors of the University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review for their efforts in making this piece the best it could be.  I 
also want to thank Stephanie Hales and Ryan McCarthy for their thoughtful sugges-
tions.  Lastly, and most importantly, I would also like to thank my wife and family for 
their help and support.  All errors are mine alone. 
1 See infra notes 16-17 and accompanying text (discussing early definitions of the 
public trust doctrine in Supreme Court cases). 
2 Cyane Gresham, Note, Improving Public Trust Protections of Municipal Parkland in 
New York, 13 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 259, 263 (2002). 
3 See infra notes 31-33 and accompanying text (discussing U.S. Supreme Court 
holdings permitting the transfer of public lands to private parties where doing so pro-
motes the public interest by serving a public purpose). 
4 See Williams v. Gallatin, 128 N.E. 121, 122 (N.Y. 1920) (“A park is a pleasure 
ground set apart for recreation of the public . . . . It need not, and should not, be a 
mere field or open space, but no objects, however worthy . . . which have no connec-
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a reformulation of the public trust doctrine in New York in conso-
nance with the historical public use test, as defined by the United 
States Supreme Court most recently in Kelo v. City of New London5 and 
New York state courts more than three decades ago in Yonkers Commu-
nity Development Agency v. Morris.6  Focusing specifically on New York 
City parks, I argue that a reformulated public trust doctrine will per-
mit optimal public benefit from privatization of some green spaces.  
This public benefit will come in the form of revitalized green spaces, 
previously forsaken by municipal government.  Further, a reformu-
lated public trust doctrine will limit judicial intervention in this area 
to the courts’ traditional role of striking down transactions in which 
government overreaches and attempts to transfer trust lands pre-
dominantly, not incidentally, for the benefit of private third parties.7
In New York, the public trust doctrine has developed on a case-by-
case basis, with decisions alternately broadening or narrowing the 
definition of park use and thereby allowing either more or less oppor-
tunity for private use of public lands.8  This sort of analysis not only 
creates uncertainty, but also fundamentally misses the point.  The 
form of the public trust doctrine, broad or narrow, should depend on 
what courts will accept as a sufficient public benefit accruing from  
private control of lands held in public trust, not on what courts  
believe constitutes a park or non-park use.  Thus, the doctrinal ques-
tion with park purposes, should be permitted to encroach upon it without legislative 
authority plainly conferred . . . .”); see also Friends of Van Cortlandt Park v. City of New 
York, 750 N.E.2d 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 2001) (“[O]ur courts have time and again reaf-
firmed the principle that parkland is impressed with a public trust, requiring legislative 
approval before it can be alienated or used for an extended period for non-park pur-
poses.” (footnote omitted)).  It is difficult to predict exactly what qualifies as a park or 
non-park use because New York courts approach this question on a case-by-case basis, 
pursuant to a fact-intensive inquiry.  See infra Part III (discussing the inconsistency of 
New York’s public trust doctrine as applied to parkland); see also Gresham, supra note 
2, at 300 (describing uses that the New York courts have deemed “park uses”); infra 
note 36 and accompanying text (providing examples of approved park uses). 
5 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005); see also infra Part II (discussing the Supreme Court’s defi-
nition of “public use” in its takings jurisprudence as a public purpose and a public 
benefit). 
6 335 N.E.2d 327, 330-31 (N.Y. 1975). 
7 See Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law:  Effective Judi-
cial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471, 495-96 (1970) (describing the courts’ role as 
forcing the legislature to expressly transfer trust lands to private third parties where such 
transfers appear to subordinate the public interest).  Sax argues that the courts, in 
forcing government to expressly authorize questionable transfers to private parties, 
create “an openness and visibility which is the public’s principal protection against 
overreaching, but which is often absent in the routine political process.”  Id. at 496. 
8 See infra Part III (summarizing the evolving New York doctrine). 
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tion should be how a jurisdiction’s highest court and/or the United 
States Supreme Court define(s) public use and public benefit.9  Seen 
through this lens, the public trust doctrine takes its cues from the 
Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause. 
Part I of this Comment briefly traces the origin and evolution of 
the public trust doctrine in the United States.  This discussion serves 
two purposes.  First, it dispels the notion that the public trust doctrine 
is an inherently environmentalist doctrine.  One may put the doctrine 
to environmentalist ends, but its historical origin is rooted in govern-
ment encouragement of economic development.10  Second, the dis-
cussion in Part I shows that the American public trust doctrine, as ini-
tially enunciated by the U.S. Supreme Court, incorporates the public 
use test. 
Part II examines the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Kelo and 
discusses its implications for reformulating New York’s public trust 
doctrine with respect to parkland.  Kelo’s condoning of private-to-
private takings turns on a cementing of the definition of “public use” 
as public purpose or benefit; this test coincides with the public use 
doctrine as developed by New York state courts three decades earlier 
in Morris.11  While it creates a dilemma for private property rights ad-
9 On such a state law issue, the highest state court is, of course, authoritative in the 
state.  Holdings of the U.S. Supreme Court, though not binding under federalism prin-
ciples, are nonetheless highly persuasive.  In Shivley v. Bowlby, the Supreme Court held 
that the individual states have the authority to define the scope of the public trust doc-
trine as it applies within each state.  See Shivley v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 26 (1894) 
(“[T]here is no universal and uniform law upon the subject; but . . . each State has 
dealt with the lands . . . within its borders according to its own views of justice and pol-
icy . . . .”); see also Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 475 (1988) (“[I]t 
has been long established that the individual States have the authority to define the 
limits of the lands held in public trust and to recognize private rights in such lands as 
they see fit.”); Geoffrey R. Scott, The Expanding Public Trust Doctrine:  A Warning to Envi-
ronmentalists and Policy Makers, 10 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 1, 23 (1998) (“The actual con-
temporary definition of the public trust varies from state to state and the only certain 
observation that might be made about the doctrine is that there is no single or uni-
form, [sic] explanation or application.”). 
10 See MOLLY SELVIN, THIS TENDER AND DELICATE BUSINESS:  THE PUBLIC TRUST 
DOCTRINE IN AMERICAN LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY 1789-1920, at 11-12 (Harold 
Hyman & Stuart Bruchey eds., American Legal and Constitutional History:  A Garland 
Series of Outstanding Dissertations, 1987) (framing the evolution of the public trust 
doctrine in nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century American history “as part of th[e] 
effort toward promotion and regulation of economic development by government 
through the legal system”). 
11 See Morris, 335 N.E.2d at 330-31 (holding that the City of Yonkers’s taking of pri-
vate property to expand an Otis Elevator Company plant was for a public purpose be-
cause “economic underdevelopment and stagnation are also threats to the public suffi-
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vocates in the takings context, the broadened definition of public use 
is a practical test in the public trust context.  It permits measured pri-
vate development of public property for the benefit of the public, 
without hindering judicial authority to void, pursuant to the public 
trust doctrine, transfers made primarily for the benefit of private par-
ties.  In other words, the exception does not swallow the rule. 
Part III reviews the major New York cases to show that the current 
doctrine is unworkable and concludes that a doctrinal move from 
park use to public use is necessary.  A special focus is the Appellate Di-
vision’s 2002 ruling in SFX Entertainment, Inc. v. City of New York,12 
which affirmed the decision of the New York Supreme Court (the trial 
court in that state) but rejected its reasoning.  SFX is the latest in a 
line of New York cases alternately expanding and narrowing the defi-
nition of park/non-park use.  This jurisprudential tension arises be-
cause the New York courts rely on the notion of park use rather than 
public use in framing the public trust doctrine.  While puzzling under 
the park/non-park formulation, the outcome in SFX makes sense in 
light of the public use test. 
Part IV examines some of the effects of reformulating, under the 
cover of Kelo, Morris, and the public use test, the public trust doctrine 
as applied to parkland in New York.  While some might view such a 
move as the harbinger of a disastrous environmental scenario, equat-
ing economic development with public use need not sacrifice envi-
ronmental aspirations.  Thus, Part IV argues for a more systematic fo-
cus on long-term licensing and development of underutilized New 
York City parkland by private entrepreneurs in close partnership with 
the Department of Parks and Recreation, and with an emphasis on 
maximizing potential public enjoyment derived from the City’s green 
spaces.  While this reformulation of the public trust doctrine may ap-
pear to have very little to do with the environmental goals some view 
as traditionally associated with the doctrine,13 its implementation in 
cient to make their removal cognizable as a public purpose”); see also David C. Wilkes & 
John D. Cavallaro, This Land is Your Land?  Eminent Domain’s Public Use Limitation, N.Y. 
ST. B.J., Oct. 2005, at 10, 14, 16 (arguing that the decision in Kelo does nothing more 
than reaffirm federal precedent and depicting the similarities between the federal and 
New York State public use tests). 
12 747 N.Y.S.2d 91, 92 (App. Div. 2002). 
13 Only since the mid-twentieth century has the doctrine’s focus shifted away from 
economic development and towards an environmentalist agenda.  See SELVIN, supra note 
10, at 5-10 (recounting the doctrine’s role as a tool in nineteenth- and early-twentieth-
century American economic development and describing its evolution into a means 
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New York will allow for privatization and optimal public use of our 
parkland in environmentally and economically sound ways. 
I.  DOCTRINAL ORIGINS 
The public trust doctrine’s origins show that it is not innately  
environmentalist.  Further, early statements of the doctrine in Ameri-
can jurisprudence connect it with the public use test, thereby support-
ing the thesis that the public use test should be the rule with respect 
to the validity of a government’s lease or license of public land to pri-
vate parties. 
Scholars trace the origin of the public trust doctrine to Roman 
civil law and English common law.14  The United States inherited the 
public trust doctrine from Great Britain.  Before the American Revo-
lution, the navigable waterways and lands underneath them belonged 
to the King, in trust for the people, to ensure unimpeded access for 
navigation and commerce.15  After the Revolution, ownership of such 
property vested in the American people as a whole,16 with each State 
holding title to such property within its borders in public trust.17
for upholding environmental legislation enacted to curb pollution and the destruction 
of natural resources). 
14 See id. at 17-25 (reviewing antecedents to the public trust doctrine in Roman 
civil law and English common law).  Roman civil law included the notion of res com-
munes, which covered items such as “the air, the oceans, the sea-shore, running water 
and ocean fish” that were “incapable of private ownership” and “open to the free use 
of all,” and the notion of res publicae, which covered such items as “public roads, har-
bors, rivers and riverbanks” that “were considered to be the property of the Roman 
people” and “were held for the free use of all.”  Id. at 17.  In contrast, at English com-
mon law, the King “had dominion over these resources,” but “the public had uninter-
rupted and inalienable rights of use and passage in them.”  Id. at 25.  Such public 
rights were known as jus publicum.  Id. 
15 See Shivley v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 57 (1893) (“At common law, the title and the 
dominion in lands flowed by the tide were in the King for the benefit of the nation.”); 
Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 457 (1892) (“[P]rior to the Revolution, the 
shore and lands under water of the navigable streams . . . belonged to the King of 
Great Britain . . . and devolved to the State[s] by right of conquest.”). 
16 See Shivley, 152 U.S. at 57 (“Upon the American Revolution, [the title and do-
minion in lands flowed by the tide], charged with a like trust, were vested in the origi-
nal States within their respective borders, subject to the rights surrendered by the Con-
stitution to the United States.”); Martin v. Lessee of Waddell, 41 U.S. 367, 410 (1842) 
(“[W]hen the Revolution took place, the people of each state became themselves sov-
ereign; and in that character hold the absolute right to all their navigable waters and 
the soils under them for their own common use, subject only to the rights since sur-
rendered by the Constitution . . . .”). 
17 The U.S. Supreme Court observed that the title is 
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The public trust doctrine is not inherently tied to environmental-
ist goals,18 even though such goals may be consonant with the goal of 
managing public property for the public benefit.  Rather, as one 
scholar has noted, “[t]he longer the doctrine is exposed to the light of 
analysis, the more it becomes clear that the term is truly political/legal 
in content, and philosophical/social in context.”19  As such, the doc-
different in character from that which the State holds in lands intended for 
sale. . . . It is a title held in trust for the people of the State that they may enjoy 
the navigation of the waters, carry on commerce over them, and have liberty 
of fishing therein freed from the obstruction or interference of private par-
ties. 
Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 452. 
18 The starting point for understanding any argument for reformulation of the 
public trust doctrine as it applies to parkland in New York City is to dispel the modern 
myth that the public trust doctrine is an environmentalist doctrine.  Many scholars 
have been unable to avoid this claim in some form.  See JACK H. ARCHER ET AL., THE 
PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE AND THE MANAGEMENT OF AMERICA’S COASTS 1-5 (1994) (ar-
guing that the public trust doctrine has unique potential vis-à-vis preserving America’s 
coastal areas); JOHN CRONIN & ROBERT F. KENNEDY, JR., THE RIVERKEEPERS:  TWO AC-
TIVISTS FIGHT TO RECLAIM OUR ENVIRONMENT AS A BASIC HUMAN RIGHT 145 (1997) 
(“[C]ourts and Congress began to breathe life into the moribund Public Trust Doc-
trine, raising it up in a new iteration:  modern environmental law.”); Joseph L. Sax, 
Liberating the Public Trust Doctrine from Its Historical Shackles, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 185, 
188, 193 (1980) (suggesting that “[t]he central idea” of the public trust doctrine is to 
prevent destabilizing public expectations as related to land use, “whether the expecta-
tions are those . . . of a diffuse public benefit from ecosystem protection or of a com-
munity’s water supply”); see also Scott, supra note 9, at 3 (“The public trust doctrine has 
been heralded by environmental activists as a valuable weapon in the fight to preserve 
the earth’s resources in a natural state and to make their enjoyment more readily ac-
cessible to the populus at large.”).  Yet Scott discerns that the public trust doctrine is a 
product of the sociopolitical environment; thus, in its environmentalist form it is “vul-
nerable to the same political forces through which [that form initially] found expres-
sion.”  Id. at 70.  As such, the doctrine is constantly open to new interpretation and  
application.  Further, the position that the public trust doctrine is innately environ-
mentalist misses the point that the doctrine is designed to protect resources for the 
public benefit.  One commentator explained that 
[t]he public trust doctrine does not exist to allow judges to act as roving am-
bassadors on behalf of a “public” consisting mainly of environmentalists.  
Rather, the doctrine protects the resources themselves.  To be sure, applica-
tion of the public trust doctrine may prohibit development of a resource by a 
single private commercial entity, but that result allows the resource to remain 
open for use by a much wider range of interests—commercial and non-
commercial. 
Charles F. Wilkinson, The Public Trust Doctrine in Public Land Law, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 
269, 315-16 (1980). 
19 Scott, supra note 9, at 23.  Contra CRONIN & KENNEDY, supra note 18, at 145 (ar-
guing that recently enacted environmental statutes, including “[t]he Clean Water Act, 
the Clean Air Act, the Endangered Species Act, and the National Environmental Policy 
Act[,] are all best understood as a modern guarantee of the protection of ancient pub-
lic trust rights in an industrial age”). 
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trine evolves over time.20  Thus, while in recent years the doctrine has 
been a valuable tool for environmentalists and conservationists, noth-
ing innate to the doctrine demands that it continue to be so used.21
For much of its early existence in the United States, spanning the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the doctrine was the gov-
ernment’s tool to “encourage and direct economic growth.”22  It “be-
came a viable means for judicial allocation of valuable resources,” and 
it was not considered odd for a court to find that “[t]he ‘public good’ 
might often best be served by the private development of trust prop-
erty—-by perhaps a railroad or pipeline company—even if that devel-
opment disrupted the traditional public uses of the property.”23  Im-
plicit in such an interpretation of the doctrine is the notion that the 
public benefit or public purpose24 justifying use of trust lands may be 
equatable to economic development primarily for the public good. 
Permutations of the public trust doctrine vary from state to state.25  
As they have evolved over time, American versions of the doctrine 
generally pigeonhole land and bodies of water into two categories of 
property:  “(1) that which is capable of transfer, in usual and ordinary 
course, to private ownership; and (2) that which is not and is to be 
20 See Wilkinson, supra note 18, at 280-84, which describes three stages of the doc-
trine’s evolution.  During the first era, beginning in the mid-nineteenth century and 
continuing until approximately 1888, the federal government was “merely a temporary 
custodian and trustee,” charged with the trust duty “to sell off the lands for the com-
mon benefit so that new states . . . could operate as sovereigns on an equal footing with 
the original states . . . .”  Id. at 280.  During the second era, from 1888 to approximately 
1970, “[a] consensus developed that those particular lands and resources should not 
be subject to random disposal but rather should be protected and managed by the 
United States for future generations.”  Id.  Finally, during the third era, beginning in 
1970, individuals began applying the public trust doctrine “to limit federal power and 
to justify rights of the public against the federal government.”  Id. at 284. 
21 See supra note 18 and accompanying text (rehearsing the scholarly debate be-
tween those who believe the public trust doctrine is innately environmentalist and 
those who believe its purpose evolves depending on the sociopolitical climate). 
22 SELVIN, supra note 10, at 11. 
23 Id. at 5, 149.  As such, the period is littered with examples of cases in which the 
courts “validated extraordinary legislative grants of privilege to semi-public corpora-
tions, most specifically the railroads and turnpike companies.”  Id. at 123.  The courts 
in effect determined that “the operation of railroads and turnpikes on city streets . . . 
was consistent with the public trust under which the state legislatures and municipal 
corporations held those properties.”  Id. 
24 See infra Part II (proposing that one should view the concepts of public use and 
public benefit as synonymous). 
25 See Shivley v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 26 (1893) (“[T]here is no universal and uni-
form law upon the subject; but . . . each State has dealt with the lands under the tide 
waters within its borders according to its own views of justice and policy . . . .”). 
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held by government in a public trust for its constituents.”26  Histori-
cally, in America, the doctrine has focused on government ownership 
of waterways in fee simple.27  Some states, however, including New 
York, have expanded the doctrine to include other “public re-
source[s] in which the community has a special interest.”28  For exam-
ple, different variations of the doctrine encompass submerged lands29 
and public parks.30
The federal rule, as set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in Illinois 
Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois,31 permits the transfer of trust lands only 
under very specific circumstances.  The Court held that “control of 
the State for the purposes of the trust can never be lost, except as to 
such parcels as are used in promoting the interests of the public therein, or 
can be disposed of without any substantial impairment of the public 
interest in the lands and waters remaining.”32  Only under these cir-
26 Scott, supra note 9, at 15. 
27 See supra note 15; see also Wilkinson, supra note 18, at 305-06 (analyzing the ap-
plication of the public trust doctrine to federal inlands and determining that, while 
some aspects of the doctrine as it applies to waterways do not apply with respect to fed-
eral inlands, other aspects do). 
28 Scott, supra note 9, at 19. 
29 See Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453 (1892) (holding that granting 
almost all of the submerged lands in Chicago’s harbor to a railroad company was void-
able because such a grant “has never been adjudged to be within the legislative 
power”). 
30 See, e.g., infra Part III (discussing the public trust doctrine as it applies to parks 
in New York); see also Douglass v. City Council of Montgomery, 24 So. 745, 746 (Ala. 
1898) (finding that the city council could not alienate parkland held in public trust for 
the purpose of allowing a railroad to lay tracks); Big Sur Props. v. Mott, 132 Cal. Rptr. 
835, 838 (Cal. Ct. App. 1976) (holding that where property is acquired through private 
dedication as a public park, “it is without the power of a municipality to divert or with-
draw the land from use for park purposes” (quoting Slavich v. Hamilton, 257 P. 60, 61 
(Cal. 1927))). 
31 146 U.S. 387 (1892).  See Sax, supra note 7, at 489-91 (summarizing succinctly 
this confusing Supreme Court opinion). 
32 Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 453 (emphasis added).  Joseph Sax, however, sug-
gests that the doctrinal exception is not merely a public use test as in the takings con-
text, but rather argues that the case law implies three limitations on a government’s 
authority to transfer trust lands:  first, trust property “must not only be used for a pub-
lic purpose,” but also “must be held available for use by the general public”; second, 
“the property may not be sold, even for a fair cash equivalent”; and third, the property 
must be put only to “particular types of uses.”  Sax, supra note 7, at 477.  In support of 
his view as the correct articulation of the doctrine’s scope, Sax urges that “[c]onfusion 
has arisen from the failure of many courts to distinguish between the government’s 
general obligation to act for the public benefit, and the special, and more demanding, 
obligation which it may have as a trustee of certain public resources.”  Id. at 478.  Such 
a reading, however, contradicts the above-quoted language used by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in Illinois Central Railroad to describe when government may transfer trust lands 
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cumstances may the legislature alienate trust-protected property.  
Similarly, state courts, including those in New York, have held that 
government may transfer public trust property “so long as the grantee 
will place it into public service by executing a trust purpose through 
private initiative.”33
Thus, to determine whether property owned by a state is alien-
able, courts must apply a two-step analysis.  First, courts must deter-
mine whether such property is protected by the public trust doctrine.  
Historically, trust-protected lands and bodies of water were those 
linked to navigational and commercial purposes.34  In modern times, 
the reasons for subjecting property to the doctrine have been ex-
panded to include “forms of pure avocational activity.”35  In New York, 
for example, public parkland may be leased or (under modern case 
law) licensed to private parties for the purpose of conducting dances, 
concerts, and theater; constructing monuments and statues; and 
building and operating restaurants and food facilities, parking lots, 
zoos, gardens, and concessions.36  Second, if the doctrine protects the 
property in question, courts must determine whether the private party 
to private parties.  Further, Sax admits that support for his three-pronged formulation 
of the doctrine’s scope comes mainly from dicta and that “the case law has not devel-
oped in any way that permits confident assertions about the outer limits of state 
power.”  Id. at 486. 
33 Scott, supra note 9, at 22.  The New York courts, beginning with the Court of 
Appeals in Williams v. Gallatin, have drawn a very fine, often shifting, line with respect 
to whether a stated purpose sufficiently facilitates the “public means of pleasure, rec-
reation, and amusement, and thus provide[s] for the welfare of the community,” 128 
N.E. 121, 123 (N.Y. 1920), such that the transfer of the right to use parkland to a pri-
vate party is valid.  Where, however, the Parks Commissioner attempts to transfer the 
right to use property to a private person or corporation and the transferee’s purpose 
in gaining control of the parkland does not sufficiently implicate a park-appropriate 
purpose, legislative approval is necessary or the courts will void the transfer.  Id. at 122; 
see also Gresham, supra note 2, at 268 (“New York courts have a long tradition of ex-
tending public trust protections to municipal parks by requiring specific state legisla-
tive authorization for sale, alienations, or non-park uses of the land.” (footnotes omit-
ted)). 
34 See, e.g., Barney v. City of Keokuk, 94 U.S. 324, 338 (1876) (“[T]he public au-
thorities ought to have entire control of the great passageways of commerce and navi-
gation, to be exercised for the public advantage and convenience.”); see also Phillips 
Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 488 (1988) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) 
(opining that “the fundamental purpose of the public trust is to protect commerce”). 
35 Scott, supra note 9, at 20. 
36 See Gresham, supra note 2, at 300 (categorizing park and non-park uses of park-
land in New York). 
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will use such property for a trust purpose benefiting the public.37  This 
second step effectively incorporates the public use test prevalent in 
takings analysis into the public trust doctrine.38
II.  THE PROMISE OF THE KELO DILEMMA IN THE PUBLIC TRUST CONTEXT 
The historical public trust doctrine incorporates the public use 
test developed in takings jurisprudence, whereby government may 
transfer trust lands to private parties for the public benefit.39  Thus, to 
determine what the appropriate scope of the public trust doctrine in 
New York should be with respect to protecting parkland, it is first nec-
essary to understand the scope of the public use test as developed by 
New York state courts and the U.S. Supreme Court. 
The Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause,40 which applies to the 
states through the Fourteenth Amendment,41 creates a two-step analy-
sis that courts must apply to determine if government can take private 
real property.  The first step is to determine whether government 
takes the private realty for a public use, while the second step is to en-
sure that the government provides just compensation.42  The public 
use element is a disabling restraint.43  If it is not fulfilled, then the 
analysis ends, and presumably the government’s sole option is to ne-
gotiate with the private landowner for her property. 
37 See supra note 32 and accompanying text (suggesting that the U.S. Supreme 
Court has established the public use test as the exception to public trust doctrine pro-
tections). 
38 See infra Part II (describing the public use doctrine). 
39 See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text (explaining that a government may 
transfer public trust property to private individuals only where such transfer serves the 
public interest). 
40 U.S. CONST. amend. V (providing in part that no “private property [shall] be 
taken for public use, without just compensation”). 
41 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (providing that no state shall “deprive any person 
of . . . property, without due process of law”); Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. 
v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 239 (1897) (applying the Fifth Amendment Takings 
Clause to the states by means of the Fourteenth Amendment); see also Tahoe-Sierra 
Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 306 n.1 (2002) (“Of-
ten referred to as the ‘Just Compensation Clause,’ the final Clause of the Fifth 
Amendment . . . applies to the States as well as the Federal Government.”). 
42 See Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 231-32 (2003) (“[T]he taking 
must be for a ‘public use’ and ‘just compensation’ must be paid to the owner.”). 
43 See Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2672 (2005) (O’Connor, J., dis-
senting) (“The public use requirement . . . imposes a more basic limitation, circum-
scribing the very scope of the eminent domain power:  Government may compel an 
individual to forfeit her property for the public’s use, but not for the benefit of another 
private person.”). 
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The U.S. Supreme Court recently revisited the public use question 
in Kelo v. City of New London, and, in doing so, the Court cemented the 
redefinition of “public use” as for a public purpose and public bene-
fit.44  This decision, it seems, authorizes future private-to-private trans-
fers, by means of the takings power, in the name of economic devel-
opment.  In Kelo, the New London City Council authorized the New 
London Development Corporation (NLDC), “a private nonprofit en-
tity established . . . to assist the City in planning economic develop-
ment,” “to purchase property or to acquire property by exercising 
eminent domain in the City’s name.”45  The petitioners, private land-
owners who refused to sell to the NLDC, commenced suit claiming 
“the taking of their properties would violate the ‘public use’ restric-
tion in the Fifth Amendment.”46  Thus, the issue before the Court was 
“whether a city’s decision to take property for the purpose of eco-
nomic development satisfies the ‘public use’ requirement of the Fifth 
Amendment.”47
The Kelo Court held that such economic development takings are 
constitutional under the Fifth Amendment because they “unques-
44 See id. at 2663-64 (reasoning that the public benefit of a proposed economic de-
velopment plan is analogous to other public purposes previously approved by the 
Court).  The move in this direction had been foreshadowed in earlier Supreme Court 
cases.  In Berman v. Parker, a unanimous Court upheld a redevelopment plan invoking 
eminent domain and targeting a blighted area in Washington, D.C., reasoning that 
“[t]he concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive,” and “[i]t is within the 
power of the legislature to determine that the community should be beautiful as well 
as healthy, spacious as well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled.”  348 
U.S. 26, 33 (1954).  The Court also opened the door to the accomplishment of public 
purposes by means of private enterprise when it stated that “[w]e cannot say that pub-
lic ownership is the sole method of promoting the public purposes of community re-
development projects.”  Id. at 34.  Similarly, in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, the 
Court held that the takings power could be used by the government to establish the 
Land Reform Act of 1967, which reduced the concentration of land ownership for the 
public purpose of eliminating “the perceived social and economic evils of a land oli-
gopoly.”  467 U.S. 229, 241-42 (1984).  In condoning the Hawaiian law, the Court rea-
soned that “it is only the taking’s purpose, and not its mechanics,” that determines 
whether a public use exists, and further stated that the Court had “long ago rejected 
any literal requirement that condemned property be put into use for the general pub-
lic.”  Id. at 244; see also Wilkes & Cavallaro, supra note 11, at 12-14 (discussing how Kelo 
adheres to U.S. Supreme Court precedent “that long ago established an expansive 
definition of the Public Use Clause”); cf. Yonkers Cmty. Dev. Agency v. Morris, 335 
N.E.2d 327, 331 (N.Y. 1975) (reasoning that just because “the vehicle for renewed use 
of the land . . . may be a private agency” does not mean the taking is not permissible if 
it serves a public purpose).
45 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2660. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. at 2661. 
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tionably serve[] a public purpose.”48  Specifically, the Court found 
that the proposed economic development plan has a reasonable 
chance of producing “new jobs and increased tax revenue.”49  The 
Court equated the public benefits of the City’s plan to those benefits 
reasonably accruing from approved takings in prior cases.50
While Kelo was the first U.S. Supreme Court case to deal explicitly 
with economic development takings, the New York courts resolved this 
issue more than thirty years ago.  In Yonkers Community Development 
Agency v. Morris, private landowners and business owners within the 
City of Yonkers claimed the City took their property “for a private 
purpose, [namely], the expansion of the current plant facilities of the 
Otis Elevator Company.”51  The New York Court of Appeals, the state’s 
highest court, held that a taking for the expansion of the Otis Elevator 
Company was for a public purpose, reasoning that “economic under-
development and stagnation are also threats to the public sufficient to 
make their removal cognizable as a public purpose.”52  The Morris 
court seems to identify two public benefits justifying the taking:  first, 
where “land is found to be substandard, its taking for urban renewal is 
for a public purpose, just as it would be if it were taken for a public 
park, public school or public street”;53 second, a public benefit exists 
“in assuring the retention of Otis as an increased source of employ-
ment opportunity in Yonkers.”54  Moreover, the court was not worried 
by the fact that a private benefit might accrue to Otis, so long as “the 
public purpose was dominant.”55
While cases like Kelo and Morris are problematic for private prop-
erty rights advocates in the takings context, they actually can provide a 
twofold potential benefit in the public trust context.  First, application 
48 Id. at 2665. 
49 Id. 
50 Id.  (“It would be incongruous to hold that the City’s interest in the economic 
benefits to be derived from the development of the Fort Trumbull area has less of a 
public character than any of those other interests [arising in the context of other tak-
ings previously approved by the Court].”). 
51 335 N.E.2d 327, 330 (N.Y. 1975). 
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 331. 
54 Id. 
55 Id.  In the thirty-plus years since Morris, the New York state courts have devel-
oped an expansive “dominant public purpose-incidental private benefit standard,” 
which leaves condemnees “little room . . . to argue that a public purpose is not being 
served.”  Wilkes & Cavallaro, supra note 11, at 16.  The New York rule, however, would 
seemingly void any taking actions effectuated primarily for the benefit of a private 
party. 
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of the public use test, as developed by the United States Supreme 
Court and the New York state courts, can clarify the scope of the pub-
lic trust doctrine as applied to municipal parks in New York and else-
where.  Rather than focusing on the fuzzy distinction between park 
use and non-park use,56 the doctrine should aim at deciphering 
whether a public benefit accrues as a result of a municipal license or 
lease of parkland.57
Second, application of the public use doctrine in the public trust 
context can provide greater opportunity for private entrepreneurship 
and optimal public use of parkland.  The public use test, which ap-
pears dangerously broad in the takings context, may actually do a 
good job of encouraging private investment in public land.  As de-
fined by the federal and New York courts, the public use test incorpo-
rated into the public trust doctrine will be broad enough to permit 
optimal development of public parkland for the benefit of all citizens 
and narrow enough to ensure that the courts will void licenses or 
leases of public land producing predominantly private benefits.  Ar-
guably, this is exactly as it should be.58
56 See infra Part III (noting confusion in the New York doctrine as currently consti-
tuted and arguing that clarity is attainable by means of applying the public use test in 
the public trust context). 
57 While the question of what constitutes a public use or benefit is itself less than 
perfectly clear, it is nonetheless a question courts must answer within specifically drawn 
boundaries.  In contrast, the decision as to whether some use is a park or non-park use 
seems wholly whimsical.  Though some might argue that the public use test is also 
wholly whimsical, the fact remains that the U.S. Supreme Court has been largely con-
sistent in delineating categories of public uses and subsequently applying them in new 
cases.  See supra note 44 (summarizing Supreme Court cases that define public use).  
The New York courts, however, in applying the park use test often reach different con-
clusions based on similar, if not identical, facts.  See infra Part III (recounting how dif-
ferent New York courts have reached vastly different conclusions regarding what is a 
park use based on the same facts, first in Friends of Van Cortlandt Park v. City of New York, 
750 N.E.2d 1050 (N.Y. 2001), and subsequently in SFX Entertainment, Inc. v. City of New 
York, 747 N.Y.S.2d 91 (App. Div. 2002)).  This is not to suggest that the public use test 
is perfectly clear.  Indeed, it is less than perfectly clear.  It seems, however, that less 
than perfectly clear is much better than wholly whimsical. 
58 This result appears correct on policy grounds because the public trust doctrine, 
as applied to public parkland, is designed to ensure that the public interest in such 
lands is protected.  Where government attempts to transfer public land to private indi-
viduals merely for their private interests, the public interest is not only subordinated, 
but also defeated.  The courts would not uphold such a transfer unless it were ex-
pressly sanctioned by the legislature.  If, however, the public-to-private transfer serves 
the public interest, whether by means of license, lease, or alienation approved by the 
legislature, the courts should not disturb the judgment of the governmental body 
charged with managing the parkland for the public. 
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Some might argue that such a doctrinal shift will have negative 
environmental implications as public lands are pillaged by private in-
dustry under the Kelo/Morris framework.  Courts, the argument goes, 
will apply this broadened definition of “public use” and narrow the 
public trust doctrine’s environmental protections by expanding the 
public use test to permit the unbridled transfer of trust property.  In 
other words, there will be too much judicial discretion, leading to an 
environmentally unfriendly result.  Thus, those government entities 
charged with managing public trust lands will attempt, and the courts 
will permit, more public-to-private transfers without legislative ap-
proval. 
The problem with this counterargument is that judicial discretion 
is inherent in the common law public trust doctrine.  This argument 
does not so much critique judicial discretion itself, but rather objects 
to how courts would be wielding that discretion, in light of the public 
trust doctrine’s recent ties to environmentalist aims.  Yet the public 
trust doctrine, as Geoffrey Scott points out, is not a “universal truth”; 
rather, it is a social construct, the product “of the varying ambitions 
and philosophies of the elemental constituents” of society at a particu-
lar moment in time.59  The doctrine’s primary purpose is to ensure 
that trust property is utilized for the public benefit.60  The sociopoliti-
cal coming of age of the late 1960s61 led certain scholars to equate the 
public trust doctrine with environmentalist aims.62  Nothing, however, 
59 Scott, supra note 9, at 7 (discussing the doctrine as a social phenomenon, sub-
ject to debate and to change with the times).  Scott argues that, while environmental-
ists often “celebrate their victories” realized by means of the public trust doctrine “as 
though they have liberated universal truths,” they “fail to consider that . . . the recon-
stitution of the public trust doctrine may be vulnerable to the same political forces 
through which it found expression.”  Id. at 70.  Ultimately, for Scott, the public trust 
doctrine evolves as society evolves and “may not merely be the invocation of a manifest 
and sterile set of rules.”  Id. at 7. 
60 See Wilkinson, supra note 18, at 315-16 (addressing recent misunderstandings of 
the public trust doctrine’s purpose and defining such purpose as the protection of re-
sources for the public benefit). 
61 See ARCHER ET AL., supra note 18, at 1 (recognizing an awakening of environ-
mental consciousness among the American public in the late 1960s). 
62 See Gresham, supra note 2, at 315-19 (proposing new regulatory and legislative 
safeguards to ensure that the public trust doctrine will continue to be a tool for envi-
ronmentalists as they seek to protect New York City’s parks); see also JOHN G. SPRANK-
LING, UNDERSTANDING PROPERTY LAW 500 (2000) (“The public trust doctrine is one of 
the most far-reaching and controversial rules defining the legal relationship between 
private owners and the environment.” (emphasis omitted)); supra note 18 (summariz-
ing some of the scholarly views equating the public trust doctrine with environmental-
ist ideals).  Contra Wilkinson, supra note 18, at 315-16 (arguing that the public trust 
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exists to prevent, de facto, the doctrine’s scope from shifting again in 
the future.63
Further, it may just be that private entrepreneurs, operating un-
der a reformulated public trust doctrine, can produce greater public 
benefit from managing trust lands than government.64  The produc-
tion of optimal public benefit, environmental ideals, and incidental 
private benefit need not be mutually exclusive goals in the twenty-first 
century.  Thus, reformulating the public trust doctrine in New York by 
incorporating the historical public use test is not an antienvironment 
endeavor.  Rather, it is an effort to make environmental ideals a reality 
in places where such ideals have previously gone unrealized.65
III.  EVOLUTION OF THE PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE IN NEW YORK 
New York’s public trust doctrine is “inconsistent.”66  This flaw 
arises from common law development of the park/non-park use di-
chotomy.67  The inconsistency runs so deep that courts viewing the 
same public trust question often reach dramatically different results.68  
doctrine does not per se protect the environment, but rather protects natural re-
sources for public use and benefit). 
63 See Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 779 (1964) (arguing that 
property law is not a natural right, but rather “a construction designed to serve certain 
functions,” such that “[t]he conditions that can be attached to receipt, ownership, and 
use depend not on where property came from, but on what job it should be expected 
to perform” and on “how it functions and how it should function”); see also supra notes 
18-21 and accompanying text (arguing that the doctrine is a sociopolitical construct 
that evolves over time).
64 See John Baden & Tom Blood, Ecology and Enterprise:  Toward the Private Manage-
ment of Wildlife Resources, in ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND THE PRIVATIZING OF GOVERNMENT 
67, 67-69 (Calvin A. Kent ed., 1987) (suggesting that government mismanagement of 
the environment results in “economic inefficiency compounded with environmental 
atrocities” and proposing that “‘free market environmentalism,’” “based on private 
property rights, the rule of willing consent, and the market process,” can produce op-
timal environmental benefits). 
65 See infra Part IV (discussing real-world applications of the reformulated public 
trust doctrine in New York City). 
66 Gresham, supra note 2, at 316. 
67 See Williams v. Gallatin, 128 N.E. 121, 122 (N.Y. 1920) (“[N]o objects, however 
worthy . . . , which have no connection with park purposes, should be permitted to en-
croach upon [a park] without legislative authority plainly conferred . . . .”); Friends of 
Van Cortlandt Park v. City of New York, 750 N.E.2d 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 2001) (“In the 80 
years since Williams, our courts have time and again reaffirmed the principle that park-
land is impressed with a public trust, requiring legislative approval before it can be 
alienated or used for an extended period for non-park purposes.” (footnote omitted)). 
68 See Gresham, supra note 2, at 281-82 (discussing dramatically different results 
reached by the New York Court of Appeals, which held that construction of water 
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This doctrinal ambiguity poses a serious problem for the future of the 
doctrine in the state of New York.69  Courts apply the current doctrine 
willy-nilly according to their own normative sense of public policy and 
without any attention of ex ante considerations.  The result is a doc-
trine so malleable as to lack meaning.  As such, the time has come for 
a doctrinal shift away from the park/non-park use formulation and 
back towards the historical public trust doctrine, which requires that a 
public benefit potentially accrue before trust lands may be utilized by 
private parties.70
The public trust doctrine in New York is a common law, not a 
statutory, doctrine.71  New York courts “have a long tradition of ex-
tending public trust protections to municipal parks,” “as well as tidal 
treatment plant under parkland was a non-park use, and the federal district court, 
which, when reviewing identical facts, determined that the same plant provided an in-
valuable public benefit).  Compare SFX Entm’t, Inc. v. City of New York, 747 N.Y.S.2d 
91, 92 (App. Div. 2002) (rejecting the lower court’s finding that the concession agree-
ment to construct an amphitheater on Randall’s and Wards Islands violated the public 
trust doctrine), with SFX Entm’t, Inc. v. City of New York, No. 124059/01, 2002 WL 
1363372, at *8 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 13, 2002) (“[T]his particular concession violates the 
public trust doctrine because it authorizes substantial use of parkland for non-park pur-
poses.”). 
69 Gresham, supra note 2, at 281 (“Williams is simply not an adequate guide in the 
twenty-first century to what are proper park uses, as distinct from non-park uses requir-
ing state enabling legislation.”). 
70 See supra Part I (discussing the origins of the public trust doctrine and its early 
formulation by the United States Supreme Court). 
71 See Gresham, supra note 2, at 269. (“Statutory controls and regulations have not 
been as important as the common law in New York park protection cases.”).  New York 
General City Law section 20.2 establishes that the rights of a city in its “parks, and all 
other public places, are hereby declared to be inalienable, except in the cases provided 
for by subdivision seven of this section.”  N.Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 20.2 (McKinney 2003).  
The New York courts, however, have interpreted subdivision 7 of section 20.2 as not 
granting cities the power to discontinue or sell a park.  See In re Cent. Parkway, 251 
N.Y.S. 577, 580-81 (Sup. Ct. 1931) (“Under . . . subdivision [7] a city may sell and con-
vey only that which it may discontinue.  Since it cannot discontinue parks, it cannot sell 
or convey the same.”); Gewirtz v. City of Long Beach, 330 N.Y.S.2d 495, 510 (Sup. Ct. 
1972) (finding that “the provisions of subdivision 7 do not eliminate the need for spe-
cial legislative authority for alienation of a city’s park lands” and citing In re Central 
Parkway).  The New York City Charter contains language similar to the General City 
Law, and courts have interpreted it similarly.  See N.Y. CITY CHARTER § 383 (2003) 
(“The rights of the city in and to its . . . parks . . . are hereby declared to be inalienable; 
but upon the closing or discontinuance of any . . . park . . . the property may be sold or 
otherwise disposed of as may be provided by law . . . .”); Aldrich v. City of New York, 
145 N.Y.S.2d 732, 743 (Sup. Ct. 1955) (holding that section 383 does not expressly 
grant “power to discontinue or close a park”). 
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lands and navigable waters.”72  The New York public trust doctrine as 
applied to municipal parkland requires “specific state legislative au-
thorization for sale, alienations, or non-park uses of [trust] land.”73  
No such authorization, however, is necessary with respect to licenses 
and some leases of trust land granted by the executive branch to pri-
vate individuals for a park use.74  Doctrinal confusion inevitably arises 
over whether a given transfer of municipal parkland to a private party 
via lease or license will result in a park use. 
Three landmark cases decided by the New York Court of Appeals 
define the scope of, and illustrate the problems with, the public trust 
doctrine as currently applied to municipal parklands in that state.  In 
Brooklyn Park Commissioners v. Armstrong, the Court of Appeals held that 
the City of New York could not sell or convey an interest in trust land 
without legislative approval.75  In Williams v. Gallatin, the Court of Ap-
peals again expanded the public trust doctrine in New York, holding 
that municipalities could not enter into license or lease agreements 
with private parties for the purpose of putting public parkland to a 
non-park use without first obtaining legislative approval.76  Finally, in 
72 Gresham, supra note 2, at 268.  It remains unclear, however, why New York 
courts applied the doctrine to protect municipal parks in the first place.  Id. at 267-68. 
73 Id. at 268 (footnotes omitted); see also Williams v. Gallatin, 128 N.E. 121, 122 
(N.Y. 1920) (holding that municipal parkland may not be used for a non-park purpose 
without authorization by the state legislature); Brooklyn Park Comm’rs v. Armstrong, 
45 N.Y. 234, 243 (1871) (holding that municipal parkland may not be sold without leg-
islative approval). 
74
Historically, the New York courts have deemed a lease of parkland an alienation 
of property, requiring legislative approval under Armstrong, 45 N.Y. at 243.  In contrast, 
a license that was “consistent with park uses,” that was “temporary and personal, avoid-
ing the creation of any property interest,” and that “contain[ed] a ‘terminable at will 
clause,’” did not require legislative approval.  Gresham, supra note 2, at 304.  More re-
cent New York court decisions, however, have held “that not all leases of parkland 
without legislative sanction [are] invalid.”  Id. at 305; see, e.g., Port Chester Yacht Club, 
Inc. v. Vill. of Port Chester, 507 N.Y.S.2d 465, 467 (App. Div. 1986) (holding that the 
validity of a municipal lease of parkland “turns on the nature of the use rather than the 
nature of the user” and reasoning that the lease of a dock in a public park served a 
public purpose); see also Johnson v. Town of Brookhaven, 646 N.Y.S.2d 180, 181 (App. 
Div. 1996) (holding that a lease was improper under the public trust doctrine, but ap-
plying Port Chester Yacht Club rather than Armstrong). 
75
45 N.Y. 234, 243 (1871) (“[T]he city took the title to the lands . . . for the public 
use as a park, and held it in trust for that purpose. . . . Receiving the title in trust for an 
especial public use, it could not convey without the sanction of the legislature . . . .”). 
76 128 N.E. 121, 122 (N.Y. 1920) (“[N]o objects, however worthy . . . , which have 
no connection with park purposes, should be permitted to encroach upon [a park] 
without legislative authority plainly conferred . . . .”).  Williams’s vagueness is responsi-
ble for much of the doctrinal confusion in New York, as its park/non-park use rule 
permits tremendous judicial discretion and pivots on subjectivity. 
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Friends of Van Cortlandt Park v. City of New York, the Court of Appeals 
unanimously held that the City’s construction of a water treatment 
plant (WTP) under Van Cortlandt Park required legislative authoriza-
tion because it would have disrupted public access to the public park 
for approximately five years.77  The court concluded that the disrup-
tion was a non-park use and therefore was impermissible under the 
public trust doctrine absent legislative approval.78
A closer look at the doctrine’s evolution in New York state courts 
reveals a shift from a public use test to a park/non-park use test, re-
sulting in increasing doctrinal confusion.  Armstrong itself focused on 
the intersection between takings jurisprudence and the public trust 
doctrine, and is couched in public use language.  In 1861, the City of 
Brooklyn exercised its taking power to acquire title to privately owned 
land for the purpose of establishing a public park.79  The land was 
“deemed to have been taken by the city for public use, as and for a 
public park.”80  Subsequent to the taking, the City attempted, pursu-
ant to an 1870 statute, to sell portions of the condemned land to pri-
vate individuals.81  The defendant in the case refused to take title to 
one such parcel, arguing that the City lacked authority to transfer 
land taken for the public purpose of establishing a park.82
The opinion in Armstrong makes no mention of park use as the 
test for determining whether public parkland is being used in accor-
dance with the public trust doctrine.  Rather, the holding suggests 
that the doctrine, at its core, is connected to the notion of public use.  
The court, reasoning from within the takings context, stated: 
Where the property is taken, the owner paid its true value, and the title 
vested in the public, it owns the whole property, and not merely the use; 
and, though the particular use may be abandoned [by legislative sanc-
tion], the right to the property remains.  The property is still held in 
trust for the public by the authorities.
83
77 750 N.E.2d 1050, 1054 (N.Y. 2001) (“[L]egislative approval is required when 
there is a substantial intrusion on parkland for non-park purposes . . . . Here, the pub-
lic will be deprived of valued park uses for at least five years, as plant construction pro-
ceeds.”). 
78 Though the court deemed the disruption itself a non-park use, it did not reach 
the question of whether the operation of a WTP underneath Van Cortlandt Park 
would be a non-park use.  Id. 
79 Armstrong, 45 N.Y. at 235. 
80 Id. at 236. 
81 Id. at 237-38. 
82 Id. at 238. 
83 Id. at 243. 
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Certainly, one might interpret this passage consistently with the way 
the Williams court read it in 1920.84  But the statement might also im-
ply that what is vital to the public trust doctrine is not that it limits the 
use of parkland by private third parties to some particular type of park 
use, but rather that such land, owned by the public, must in some way 
be put to a public use for the public’s benefit.  That is, “though the 
particular use may be abandoned,” the public’s right to have the land 
used for its benefit—the right to have the land put to some public 
use—remains.  Such a reading would seem to be consistent with the 
takings context in which the Armstrong court’s statement was made.85
The Williams court’s move away from a public use test towards a 
park/non-park use test in 1920 has confused the modern doctrine.  In 
Van Cortlandt, for example, the City of New York was obligated to 
comply with a 1998 consent decree “requiring filtration and disinfec-
tion” of water flowing into the city from the Croton Watershed.86  The 
City proposed construction of a WTP underneath Van Cortlandt Park 
in the Bronx.87  The United States Federal District Court for the East-
ern District of New York held that legislative approval of the project 
was unnecessary because there was “no transfer of an interest in land 
to another entity” and there would be “no diminution of parkland 
available for public use after the plant is built.”88  On appeal, the Sec-
ond Circuit certified the question, “[d]oes any aspect of the proposed 
[WTP] require state legislative approval,” to the New York Court of 
Appeals.89  Answering this question in the affirmative, the Court of 
Appeals held that construction of the WTP was a non-park use because 
“the public will be deprived of valued park uses for at least five years, 
as plant construction proceeds.”90
84 The Williams court apparently focused on the Armstrong court’s previous asser-
tion that the City took the property “for the public use as a park, and held it in trust for 
that purpose.”  Id.  Thus, the particular public use protected by the trust doctrine in 
that instance was use as a park.  Such a finding is undeniably consistent with Armstrong.  
My point, however, is the more subtle one—that, at its core, the public trust doctrine 
in New York incorporates the public use test, and that when courts move too far afield 
from the public use test, the public trust doctrine becomes unworkable. 
85 Though the meaning of “public use” in 2006 is no doubt different from its 
meaning in 1871, the notion is that in the two contexts—takings and public trust—the 
phrase should be interpreted consistently. 
86 Friends of Van Cortlandt Park v. City of New York, 750 N.E.2d 1050, 1051 (N.Y. 
2001). 
87 Id. 
88 United States v. City of New York, 96 F. Supp. 2d 195, 204 (E.D.N.Y. 2000). 
89 Van Cortlandt, 750 N.E.2d at 1053. 
90 Id. at 1054. 
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While the decision of the New York Court of Appeals is control-
ling, the inconsistency in doctrinal application is troubling.  As one 
scholar has pointed out:  “The history and controversy surrounding 
[Van Cortlandt] underscore that Williams is simply not an adequate 
guide in the twenty-first century to what are proper park uses . . . .”91  
Further, it is hard to reconcile the New York court’s categorical rejec-
tion of the project as a non-park use with the district court’s decision 
that the WTP would “supply essential public services,”92 consistent with 
notions of public use and public benefit. 
Besides the three landmark cases discussed above, more recent 
holdings by the New York Supreme Court93 and Appellate Division94 
in SFX Entertainment, Inc. v. City of New York similarly call into question 
the clarity and workability of the public trust doctrine as it applies to 
municipal parkland in New York.  The Appellate Division partially re-
versed the Supreme Court in SFX II, and seemingly narrowed the doc-
trine’s scope.  That the Appellate Division did so without explanation 
or comment once again raises doubt as to the soundness of the 
park/non-park use doctrinal formulation. 
The dispute in SFX I and SFX II arose out of an improperly con-
ducted bidding process by the New York City Department of Parks 
and Recreation (Parks Department).  The Parks Department, acting 
on the City’s behalf, “circulated a Request for Expressions of Inter-
est . . . seeking bids and proposals for development and management” 
of a proposed amphitheater to be constructed in Randall’s and Wards 
Island Park.95  While intended as flexible guidelines, the Restoration 
and Development Plan (Plan) for the park envisioned a twenty-year 
license for a “‘Plug & Play festival entertainment facility,’” which 
would include “‘covered and open sloped-lawn seating’” and “would 
enhance the public’s use, enjoyment, and recreation at the park” by 
ensuring the festival grounds would be “‘landscaped as parkland’” and 
opened for “‘recreational activities during non-event days.’”96  Clear 
Channel, among the petitioners in the action, initially determined 
“the project was not suited to its business and did not submit a bid.”97  
91 Gresham, supra note 2, at 281. 
92 City of New York, 96 F. Supp. 2d at 202. 
93 SFX Entm’t, Inc. v. City of New York (SFX I), No. 124059/01, 2002 WL 1363372, 
at *8 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 13, 2002). 
94 SFX Entm’t, Inc. v. City of New York (SFX II), 747 N.Y.S.2d 91 (App. Div. 2002). 
95 SFX I, 2002 WL 1363372, at *1. 
96 Id. at *2 (quoting Verified Petition of SFX Entertainment, Inc. et al., Ex. C at 7). 
97 Id. 
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In fact, the only bid on the project came from Q-Prime and LGM En-
tertainment (bidding collectively as “Quincunx”), with whom the 
Parks Department began negotiating a long-term license.98
During negotiations between the Parks Department and Quin-
cunx, the Plan changed drastically.  First, Quincunx required a thirty-
year license.99  Second, and more significantly, Quincunx “proposed 
changes to the plan, including . . . use of 19,200 permanent seats in-
stead of the combination of fixed and lawn seats originally contem-
plated.”100  Third, Quincunx limited the facility’s operating schedule 
to April through October, deciding to close the facility to the public 
during the remaining five months of the year.101  The Parks Depart-
ment accepted each of these changes without reopening the bidding 
process.102
The Supreme Court, New York County, struck down the agree-
ment between the City and Quincunx on two grounds.  First (and less 
important with respect to the analysis here), the court held that, 
“[b]ecause the Amphitheater Project varies substantially from what 
was envisioned in both the Plan and the Request [for proposals],” the 
project should have been reopened for bidding under applicable New 
York statutory law.103  Second, the Supreme Court held that the agree-
ment “violates the public trust doctrine because it authorizes a substan-
tial use of parkland for non-park purposes.”104  The court applied Wil-
liams and Friends of Van Cortlandt Park, reasoning that the project 
agreement “entails use of over 9 acres of parkland for a private con-
cert hall,” which the public could enjoy only upon payment of “a sub-
98 Id. 
99 Id. at *3. 
100 Id. 
101 Id. at *4.  As ultimately approved by the Parks Department, the license with 
Quincunx authorized the City “to hold a maximum of eight events a year on a non-
holiday Monday, Tuesday, or Thursday.”  Id. at *5. 
102 Id. at *3.  Even so, Clear Channel, upon learning of the changes, submitted a 
late proposal.  Id. at *4.  Its proposal “offered a 7,000–10,000 person reserved-seat thea-
ter,” and provided the City 
with a guaranteed base rent of at least $1.75 million a year with a two-percent 
per year escalation, a guarantee that $56 million would be due the City during 
the 25-year lease, and a commitment to dedicating one percent of its annual 
box office gross to the maintenance and refurbishment of playing fields on 
Randall’s Island. 
Id. (citing Verified Petition of SFX Entertainment, Inc. et al. at 8). 
103 Id. at *7. 
104 Id. at *8. 
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stantial admission fee.”105  Such a non-park use, according to the 
court, required legislative approval.106
While affirming the lower court’s decision on the grounds that the 
“agreement was not ‘consistent’ with the proposal,”107 the Appellate 
Division “disagree[d] with [the] Supreme Court’s determination that 
the award violated the public trust doctrine.”108  Without further ex-
planation or comment, the Appellate Division held that the “proposed 
amphitheater [was] a permissible park use.”109
What is really behind the Appellate Division’s reversal in SFX II?  
Arguably, in its partial reversal the Appellate Division continues to use 
the park/non-park use language as a means to reach an end dictated 
by the historical public use test.110  In doing so, however, it has ren-
dered the park/non-park use distinction virtually meaningless.  That 
is, the desired end seems to be dictating the means of analysis.  As 
such, the park/non-park language is merely a veneer to be draped 
over the court’s decision vis-à-vis what constitutes a public use. 
Under such circumstances, the time has come for a doctrinal shift 
back to the conceptual position in Armstrong.  The New York courts 
should jettison the park/non-park use language and adopt a public 
use test in the context of the public trust doctrine.111  A public use test 
is superior to the park/non-park use formulation because it will facili-
105 Id. at *9. 
106 See id.  (“[T]he Legislature must be afforded the opportunity to consider 
whether this substantial use of parkland is in the best interests of New York citizens.”). 
107 SFX II, 747 N.Y.S.2d at 92 (citing N.Y., N.Y., CODE tit. 12, §§ 1-12(w)(1) (effec-
tive July 1, 1991)). 
108 Id. 
109 Id. 
110 The amphitheater project fits the public use exception to the public trust doc-
trine because it would enhance public enjoyment of the park by increasing the scope 
of recreational activities available to park-goers, while simultaneously increasing tax 
revenue. 
111 The Appellate Division, in Port Chester Yacht Club v. Village of Port Chester, 507 
N.Y.S.2d 465 (App. Div. 1986), appears to have made this switch back to a public use 
test.  Ten years prior to the dispute in the case, the Village leased public parkland to 
the Yacht Club.  Id. at 466.  Subsequently, the Village sought to evict the Yacht Club 
under the theory that “the lease was void because the village had no authority to lease 
public park lands to a private club for private use.”  Id.  The court denied the Village’s 
motion for summary judgment, reasoning that a triable issue of material fact existed 
regarding whether the lease “serves public purposes.”  Id. at 467.  The court’s opinion 
does not discuss whether the Yacht Club was using the land for a park use, but rather 
couches its analysis in public use/purpose language.  The key question, then, was 
whether the fact that “all residents of Port Chester, even nonmembers, may launch and 
recover their boats twice a year from the yacht club’s launching ramps” was sufficient 
to constitute a public use.  Id. at 466. 
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tate a return to the public trust doctrine’s origins, permitting a mar-
riage of financial entrepreneurship and environmental consciousness, 
thereby maximizing public benefit.  Further, it will create some actual 
limits on judicial policymaking and will produce ex ante guidelines for 
contracting parties. 
IV.  BENEFITS OF DOCTRINAL REFORMULATION 
A.  Free-Market Environmentalism:   
Privatization and Restoration of Forsaken Parks 
The New York City Department of Parks and Recreation is “the 
steward of nearly 28,700 acres of land, which make up 14 percent  
of New York City.”112  Included among the 28,700 acres are approxi-
mately 12,000 acres of parkland that are “designated  natural areas,”113 
which the City, through the Parks Department, holds in public trust 
for the people of New York.  This is an awesome responsibility.  One, 
frankly, that in the wake of budget cuts over the past fifteen years, the 
City has been unable to meet.114
As a result, not all parks are equal.  For example, one might won-
der why the lawns visible from Central Park West are plush and green, 
while in a 3.3-acre municipal park in the Bronx, known as University 
Woods, “hypodermic needles, feces and used condoms litter[] the 
grounds.”115  Part of the answer is that, where public funding has 
proven grossly inadequate, a particular form of privatization, which 
can best be described as a hybrid of “contracting” and “private pay-
ment” privatization, has picked up the slack.116  New York City’s “best 
112 NEW YORK CITY DEP’T OF PARKS & RECREATION, Biennial Report, in EIGHT SEA-
SONS OF PROGRESS:  2002-2003, at 2, 2 (2003) [hereinafter Biennial Report], available at 
http://www.nycgovparks.org/sub_newsroom/biennial_report/biennial_02_03/images/
biennial2002_2003sm.pdf. 
113 Timothy Williams, Parks Even the Parks Dept. Won’t Claim, N.Y. TIMES, July 6, 
2005, at B1. 
114 See Anemona Hartocollis, For Parks in a Tangle, A Plan To Tame, N.Y. TIMES, May 
8, 2005, § 14, at 1 (“Over the last 15 years, the Parks Department’s full-time staff has 
been cut by 50 percent and its budget by at least 11 percent.”).  Given the necessary 
budget cuts, it is no wonder that certain parks are (pardon the pun) going to seed. 
115 Williams, supra note 113, at B1. 
116 See Calvin A. Kent, Privatization of Public Functions:  Promises and Problems, in EN-
TREPRENEURSHIP AND THE PRIVATIZING OF GOVERNMENT 3, 13-17 (Calvin A. Kent ed., 
1987) (describing five forms of privatization, including the sale of government enter-
prises, contracting, private payment, competition, and public funding of private ser-
vices).  Contracting privatization “consists of contracting with the private sector to pro-
vide public services.”  Id. at 14.  Under private payment privatization, “government still 
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maintained parks—Central Park, Bryant Park, and Prospect Park 
among them—are managed in part by private conservancies that raise 
money and hire workers independent of the Parks Department.”117  
Central Park, in particular, “is the sine qua non of privatization,” with 
all but $3.5 million of its $25 million annual operating budget coming 
from private sources.118
In contrast, what I will call “forsaken parks,”119 like University 
Woods in the Bronx and Highbridge Park in upper Manhattan, do 
not exactly stir the passions of wealthy corporations and philanthro-
pists.120  Thus, this form of privatization will take us only so far.  Fur-
ther, some critics have suggested that the City, rather than investing 
“the money . . . saved through privatization” in needy parks,121 has 
chosen to abandon them.122  Even the Parks Department appears con-
tent to forsake these once-green spaces.123
The solution to this dilemma is an entirely different form of priva-
tization, one that could become possible only if the New York public 
trust doctrine is reformulated.  For where privatization fails, in the 
sense that individual and corporate philanthropists are unwilling to 
dedicate their private dollars to maintain such parks as parks, then 
perhaps private entrepreneurs can revitalize such forsaken green 
provides the service,” in this case maintaining green spaces such as Central Park and 
Bryant Park, but “the public pays the full cost of the service through user fees.”  Id. at 
15.  Nonprofit conservancies exhibit characteristics of these two forms of privatization, 
as they contract, in place of the Parks Department, with the private sector for park 
maintenance, while also paying huge user fees in the form of private contributions. 
117 Williams, supra note 113, at B1. 
118 Hartocollis, supra note 114, § 14, at 1. 
119 Such parks are forsaken in the sense that neither private philanthropy nor mu-
nicipal government is willing to attempt to restore them. 
120 See, e.g., Biennial Report, supra note 112, at 16 (listing among the “Friends of 
Parks” conservancies such as The Battery Conservancy, Central Park Conservancy, 
Madison Square Park Conservancy, and Prospect Park Alliance, and recognizing cor-
porate donors such as American Express, Goldman Sachs, Merck, Microsoft, the Na-
tional Football League, Nike, and Verizon). 
121 Hartocollis, supra note 114, § 14, at 1. 
122 Williams, supra note 113, at B1 (reporting statements made by Parks Commis-
sioner Adrian Benepe to the effect that the City plans to “[l]et nature take its course” 
with respect to such parks as University Woods, which the Commissioner described as 
“not a park”). 
123 This Comment is in no way meant as an attack on the fine work undertaken by 
Parks Commissioner Adrian Benepe, his staff, and Parks Department employees.  As 
Commissioner Benepe has stated, “[t]his is a big system and you can’t address every 
little problem.”  Id. at B1.  Rather, I mean only to suggest that where public manage-
ment and privatization fail, perhaps a solution can be found in a reformulation of the 
public trust doctrine. 
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spaces and the communities surrounding them.  A park/non-park use 
rule, however, would hinder, if not entirely prevent, such develop-
ment by preventing license or lease of such forsaken parks to private 
individuals without legislative approval.124  Thus, to restore these for-
saken green spaces, it is first necessary to restore the public trust doc-
trine to its public use roots. 
Such a reformulated public trust doctrine in New York would 
permit the City, through the Parks Department, to lease and license 
forsaken parkland to private parties for the dual purpose of economic 
and environmental development.  Economic development need not 
be divorced from environmental goals, as illustrated by the construc-
tion of fee-based recreational spaces side by side with environmentally 
friendly commercial spaces.125  There is no reason why private entre-
preneurs cannot construct entrepreneurial spaces and park spaces 
under the theory of “free-market environmentalism.” 
The Thoreau Institute defines free-market environmentalism as 
follows: 
Like all environmentalists, free-market environmentalists believe that we 
face serious environmental problems, including pollution, habitat de-
struction, toxics, and endangered species.  Unlike some environmental-
ists, free-market environmentalists believe that decentralized tools such 
as user fees, incentives, and markets will solve those problems better 
than centralized tools such as subsidies, bureaucracy, and regulation.
126
Free-market environmentalism rests on the assumption that the 
environment is a valuable asset with market value derived from its rec-
reational uses.127  The point is that park recreation has a market value:  
124 While it is true that legislative approval might be procured for such arguably 
non-park uses, there are few certainties in the legislative process.  Indeed, the only cer-
tainties are that such a process is costly and full of political pitfalls.  Years may pass be-
fore legislative approval is received, if ever.  The unfortunate fact remains that for-
saken parks are not top political priorities for state senators and assemblypersons. 
125 Commercial spaces need not be limited to retail venues, but rather might also 
include privately run indoor concert halls, minor league baseball stadiums, aquariums, 
restaurants, hotels, and museums.  Some of these uses are arguably park uses, but all of 
them can create public benefit in the forms of education and entertainment. 
126 The Thoreau Institute, FAQs About Free-Market Environmentalism, http:// 
www.ti.org/faqs.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2006). 
127 See id. (suggesting that the market value of recreation in United States national 
forests approaches $6.6 billion annually); see also J. Bishop Grewell, All Play and No Pay:  
The Adverse Effects of Welfare Recreation, in GOVERNMENT VS. ENVIRONMENT 11 (Donald 
R. Lear & Roger E. Meiners eds., 2002), available at http://www.perc.org/pdf/ 
govenv_ch9.pdf (arguing that “parks already are commercialized” and asserting that 
“[r]ecreation is commercial activity” aligned with the tourism industry). 
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people are willing to pay for it.  Therefore, private entrepreneurs 
should be willing to operate parks in exchange for licenses and the 
right to collect user fees.128  As such, development of forsaken park-
land as a hybrid commercial-recreational park might produce suffi-
cient financial incentives to private entrepreneurs, while simultane-
ously revitalizing parkland and potentially, through job creation, the 
surrounding neighborhoods.129
B.  Increasing Public Benefit from Maintained Parks 
A reformulated public trust doctrine will also permit the realiza-
tion of optimal public benefit from maintained parks.130  As discussed 
above,131 the decision in SFX II to permit construction of an amphi-
theater in Randall’s and Wards Island Park, so long as the contract was 
properly rebid, is best explained under a public use formulation of 
the public trust doctrine.  The amphitheater creates optimal public 
128 While user fees seem antithetical to the notion of a public park, they are abso-
lutely necessary to conserve parkland where a public funding gap exists with respect to 
particular parks.  The demand for free access to public parks, what Grewell calls “wel-
fare recreation,” creates a tremendous strain on park resources and the environment 
via overuse and abuse of parkland.  Grewell, supra note 127, at 2.  Thus, welfare recrea-
tion is not consistent with conservationist goals.  Rather, privatization and collection of 
user fees will help preserve parkland by “link[ing] costs with revenues,” id., and remov-
ing park management from the political realm.  See id. at 6 (implying that Congress 
diverts funds budgeted for improvement and repair of park infrastructure to expensive 
pork projects such as “gold-plated outhouses”). 
129 Seattle’s Ravenna Park was once such a model of park privatization.  At the 
turn of the twentieth century, “it was a privately owned park that contained magnifi-
cent Douglas firs,” and which a husband and wife “had developed . . . into a family  
recreation area that brought in thousands of people a day.”  Richard Stroup, Environ-
mentalism, Free-Market, in LIBRARY OF ECON. & LIBERTY, THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
ECONOMICS (David R. Henderson ed., 2002) http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/ 
EnvironmentalismFreeMarket.html.  The government, wishing to preserve the park 
after its proprietors’ deaths, purchased it after condemnation proceedings had  
occurred.  Id.  Under public control, however, the park deteriorated and became “an 
ugly, dangerous hangout for drug users” by 1972.  Id.  The Ravenna Park example is, of 
course, temporally inverted for purposes of the current analysis, but the point is sali-
ent:  private entrepreneurs can do a better job than government in managing park-
land.  Cf. Alexander Orwin, The Privatization of Water and Wastewater Utilities:  An Inter-
national Survey, ENV’T PROBE, Aug. 1999, http://www.environmentprobe.org/ 
enviroprobe/pubs/ev542.html (surveying the benefits and the pitfalls of privatization 
of water and sewage utilities throughout the world and finding that private companies 
can better solve the intractable problems facing government-owned utilities, such as 
inadequate infrastructure, shortage of funds, and politicized decision making). 
130 By “maintained parks” I mean parks that are sufficiently funded, but that are 
not being optimally used for the public benefit. 
131 See supra Part III (summarizing the disagreement among New York cases). 
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benefit in the form of recreational enjoyment, employment opportu-
nities, and increased tax revenue.  As long as the public benefits of 
development outweigh the public benefit associated with permitting 
the land to remain as open, undeveloped space, the courts should not 
void the license.  Thus, the Appellate Division’s decision, though un-
elaborated, appears correct. 
Van Cortlandt, however, appears wrongly decided under the re-
formulated doctrine, because the public benefit from building a WTP 
under the park should have been sufficient to permit the City of New 
York to move forward with the project.  Rather than bar such projects, 
the public trust doctrine, as properly understood in light of the evolu-
tion of the public use test, actually compels such performance in the 
public interest.  While building the WTP would temporarily close cer-
tain sections of the park, this negative short-term outcome simply does 
not outweigh the long-term public benefit derived from safe and 
healthy drinking water.  If the City had proposed permanently alter-
ing the park, then the balancing might be different, but permanent 
alterations, if any, appeared to be minor in this case.132
C.  Incidental Benefits of a Reformulated Public Trust Doctrine 
Additionally, a reformulated public trust doctrine in New York will 
produce three incidental benefits.  First, reformulation will match the 
doctrine to reality.  Cases like SFX, in which the courts seem to be 
reaching for an explanation of why some proposed project is permis-
sible under the public trust doctrine, are eminently more explicable 
under a public use formulation of the doctrine.  Second, because the 
reformulated rule produces doctrinal clarity, contracting parties will 
better be able to ascertain ex ante whether their proposed transac-
tions will pass judicial muster. 
Finally, a public use reformulation will limit, though not elimi-
nate, judicial policymaking.  As discussed above, the definition of 
park/non-park use is vague and often compels the Court of Appeals 
and Appellate Division to make determinations based on their own 
132 See Friends of Van Cortlandt Park v. City of New York, 750 N.E.2d 1050, 1052 
(N.Y. 2001) (recounting that WTP construction would require demolition of certain 
park structures, which would later be restored, and noting that vents and air intake 
louvers would permanently extend above ground). 
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policy preferences.133  Yet these courts should not make policy; elected 
officials should.134  A reformulated public trust doctrine will limit judi-
cial discretion for three reasons.  First, courts will be more deferential 
to the public use test because it has a constitutional grounding in the 
Fifth Amendment.  Second, state courts are more likely to tread lightly 
where they know the contemporary U.S. Supreme Court has weighed 
in on the meaning and limits of the public use test.  Third, while some 
room for debate exists regarding whether a particular use is a public 
use, the U.S. Supreme Court has firmly established categories of pub-
lic uses.  Thus, while the public use doctrine itself may be less than 
perfectly clear, its contours are more clearly drawn than those of the 
park/non-park use test New York courts currently employ.  As such, 
the public use test is not open to the same degree of ad hoc categori-
zation to which the park/non-park test is susceptible. 
CONCLUSION 
The public trust doctrine has undergone major revisions since its 
initial enunciation in Illinois Central Railroad in 1892.  Indeed, the doc-
trine continues to evolve today.  As currently constituted with respect 
to parkland in New York State, however, the doctrine has become so 
malleable that it lacks meaning.  Thus, the next step in the doctrine’s 
evolution in New York should be a return to its historical public use 
roots.  Reincorporation of the public use test, as clearly enunciated in 
cases like Morris and Kelo, will not only clarify the public trust doctrine, 
but also provide for greater private entrepreneurship opportunities, 
focused on producing optimal public benefit and restoring green 
spaces.  Restoration of forsaken parks and more permissive private 
participation in producing optimal public benefits in well-maintained 
parks are but two immediate benefits of doctrinal reformulation.  No 
doubt additional factual contexts will reveal other public benefits in 
time, both in New York and in other states where similar problems  
exist. 
133 See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text (“Williams is simply not an ade-
quate guide in the twenty-first century to what are proper park uses, as distinct from 
non-park uses requiring state enabling legislation.”). 
134
While Supreme Court and County Court judges are elected in New York State, 
Court of Appeals and Appellate Division judges are appointed by the Governor, based 
on merit.  Am. Judicature Soc’y, Judicial Selection in the States, New York:  Current 
Methods of Judicial Selection, http://www.ajs.org/js/NY_methods.htm (last visited Oct. 
22, 2006).  As evidenced by the cases cited in Part III, supra, it is the appointed appel-
late judges who are shaping the public trust doctrine in New York. 
